



ISLMUN

SOCIAL, HUMANITARIAN AND CULTURAL COMMITTEE

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*TOPIC: THE YEMEN CRISES: SOCIAL AND HUMANITARIAN
IMPLICATIONS*

About the Committee

As the Third Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee focuses on issues with regard to the advancement of women, the protection of children, the rights of indigenous groups, the treatment of refugees, the most fundamental freedoms, and the right to self-determination. The committee also considers questions of social development, such as family, disabilities, crime prevention, criminal justice, and the international drug trade.

These issues affect countries of all sizes all over world. We will be taking a close examination at the question of fundamental freedoms and how it applies to differing religious groups as well as criminal justice. It should come as no surprise that many of the considerations of the committee will bleed into questions of human rights. It will be the determination of this committee to define some of these rights in order to promote and uphold its ideals.

Conflict: A serious disagreement or argument at a national, provincial or international level resulting in economic, humanitarian and political crises.

Intervention: Interference by a country in another country's security, political or economic affairs with or without force.

Instability: Tendency to unpredictable behavior of the state or the citizens rendering the country vulnerable and unsteady.

Introduction to the Topic:

Yemen, a small country on the Arabian Peninsula, has become the site of grievous civilian suffering amid an intractable civil war. Many analysts say the fighting, now seven years old, has turned into a proxy war: Iran-backed Houthi rebels, who overthrew the Yemeni government, are pitted against a multinational coalition led by Saudi Arabia. The conflict in Yemen pits allies of the president, Abd Rabbu Mansour Hadi, against the Iran-backed Houthi rebels and their allies, military units loyal to Hadi's predecessor, Ali Abdullah Saleh. The Saudi-led coalition, which supports Hadi, has been carrying out air strikes on the Houthis to halt their advance on the southern city of Aden.

Background:

Despite the fact that the Arab Spring of 2011 was fueled by demands for political inclusion and rising levels of political consciousness across the Middle East, it did not result in the peaceful transfer of power that many had hoped for following President Ali Abdullah Saleh's resignation, as was the case in Yemen.

As a result, there has been a political vacuum created by the absence of a strong central government that can effectively enforce its writ, resulting in the emergence of various centres of power that directly challenge the authority of the state, resulting in the formation of "states within a state" such as an alternative government in Sana'a, which is led by the Houthis.

Yemenis are suffering from a lack of employment, poverty, and an inability to supply the bare necessities of life as a result of insufficient development. Yemen's central bank was in a state of chaos, to put it mildly. Corruption has led in a reduction in water and oil supplies, which has resulted in a rise in the price of basic

commodities and gasoline. Yemen's small and medium-sized businesses and sectors have suffered because of the absence of foreign direct investment (FDI) as a consequence of the country's civil unrest.

It is also important to note the emergence of transnational terrorist networks in Yemen, such as Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the so-called "Islamic State" (IS), which are using widespread resentment and an unstable environment to recruit new members, gain support, and extend their territorial reach. In Yemen, as a consequence of the significant lack of representation on the nation's diverse terrain, sectarian tensions and ethnic bloodshed have erupted throughout the country.


A tenuous union between the north and south of Yemen, headed by Saleh, culminated in the breakdown of society as Southern separatist groups such as Hirak were established in reaction to the turmoil. There is a widespread feeling of social mistrust among the general public across society. A lack of humanitarian access to vulnerable regions, a hostile environment for non-governmental organisations, and the diversion of relief funds by the Houthis are all problems that need to be addressed in the near future.

Operation Decisive Storm, the major invasion by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, is referred to as "Operation Decisive Storm."

What are Yemen's divisions?

Yemen has long struggled with religious and cultural differences between its north and south and the legacy of European colonialism. The modern Yemeni state was formed in 1990 with the unification of the U.S.- and Saudi-backed Yemeni Arab Republic, in the north, and the USSR-backed People's Democratic Republic of

Yemen (PDRY), in the south. Ali Abdullah Saleh, a military officer who had ruled North Yemen since 1978, assumed leadership of the new country. An introduction to a few key factors that widened these political divisions and led to full-scale military conflict. Subsidy backlash. Under pressure from the International Monetary Fund, which had extended to Yemen a \$550 million loan premised on promises of economic reforms, Hadi's government lifted fuel subsidies in 2014. The Houthi movement, which had attracted support beyond its base with its criticisms of the UN transition, organized mass protests demanding lower fuel prices and a new government. Hadi's supporters and the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated party, al-Islah, held counterrallies. Houthi takeover. The Houthis captured much of Sanaa by late 2014. Reigniting a UN peace deal, they consolidated control of the capital and continued their southward advance. Hadi's government resigned under pressure in January 2015 and Hadi later fled to Saudi Arabia. Military division. Military units loyal to Saleh aligned themselves with the Houthis, contributing to their battlefield success. Other militias mobilized against the Houthi-Saleh forces, aligning with those in the military who had remained loyal to the Hadi government. Southern separatists ramped up their calls for secession. Saudi intervention. In 2015, with Hadi in exile, Riyadh launched a military campaign—primarily fought from the air—to roll back the Houthis and restore the Hadi administration to Sanaa.



Events of the war

In late January 2011—after a popular uprising in Tunisia, known as the Jasmine Revolution, had forced Pres. Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali from power, inspiring similar protests in Egypt—thousands of protesters gathered in Sanaa and several other Yemeni cities to call on Saleh to step down as president. Rejecting Saleh's concessions, protests erupted with chaos between protestors and police, with Saleh's loyalists opening fire on civilians, matters worsened and hostility grew.

Eventually the uprising led to its longtime authoritarian president, Ali Abdullah Saleh, to hand over power to his deputy, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, in 2011, April accepting the Gulf Cooperation Council plan. As president, Mr Hadi struggled to deal with a variety of problems, including attacks by jihadists, a separatist movement in the south, the continuing loyalty of security personnel to Saleh,

as well as corruption, unemployment and food insecurity. The Houthi movement A new government was formed in Afghanistan under President Hamid Karzai and a special security mission led by NATO, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), was installed by the UN Security Council to ensure basic peace and stability in the region. The next several years of the U.S- Afghan War has since then been characterized by continuous bloody clashes between the Taliban on one side and the ISAF and Afghan troops on the other as the Taliban fight to regain control over Afghanistan. The (known formally as Ansar Allah), which champions Yemen's Zaidi Shia Muslim minority and fought a series of rebellions against Saleh during the previous decade, took advantage of the new president's weakness by taking control of their northern heartland of Saada province and neighbouring areas. Ordinary Yemenis - including Sunnis - supported the Houthis, and in late 2014 and early 2015 the rebels gradually took over the capital Sanaa. The Houthis and security forces loyal to Saleh - who was thought to have backed his erstwhile enemies in a bid to regain power - then attempted to take control of the entire country, forcing Mr Hadi to flee abroad in March 2015. Alarmed by the rise of a group they believed to be backed militarily by regional Shia power Iran, Saudi Arabia and eight other mostly Sunni Arab states began an air campaign aimed at defeating the Houthis, ending Iranian influence in Yemen and restoring Mr Hadi's government. The coalition received logistical and intelligence support from the US, UK and France. At the start of the war Saudi officials forecast that it would last only a few weeks. But four years of military stalemate have followed. The Houthis meanwhile have not been dislodged from Sanaa and north-western Yemen. They have been able to maintain a siege of

the third city of Taiz and to launch regular ballistic missile and drone attacks on Saudi Arabia. In September 2019, Saudi Arabia's eastern oil fields of Abqaiq and Khurais were attacked by air, disrupting nearly half the kingdom's oil production - representing around 5% of global oil output. The Houthis claimed responsibility but Saudi Arabia and the US accused Iran of carrying out the attacks. Militants from al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and the local affiliate of the rival Islamic State group (IS) have taken advantage of the chaos by seizing territory in the south and carrying out deadly attacks, notably in Aden. The launch of a ballistic missile towards Riyadh in November 2017 prompted the Saudi-led coalition to tighten its blockade of Yemen. It said it wanted to halt the smuggling of weapons to the rebels by Iran - an accusation Tehran denied - but the restrictions led to substantial increases in the prices of food and fuel, helping to push more people into food insecurity. The alliance between the Houthis and Ali Abdullah Saleh also collapsed in November 2017 following deadly clashes over control of Sanaa's biggest mosque. Houthi fighters launched an operation to take full control of the capital and Saleh was killed. In June 2018, the coalition attempted to break the deadlock on the battlefield by launching a major offensive to capture from the Houthis the Red Sea city of Hudaydah, whose port is the principal lifeline for almost two thirds of Yemen's population. The UN warned that the port's destruction would constitute a "tipping point" beyond which it was going to be impossible to avert massive loss of life due to famine. In July 2019, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), a key ally of Saudi Arabia in the war, facing international criticism of its conduct, announced a withdrawal of its forces from Yemen. In August, fighting erupted in the south between Saudi-backed government forces and an

ostensibly allied southern separatist movement supported by the UAE, the Southern Transitional Council (STC). Forces loyal to the STC, which accused Mr Hadi of mismanagement and links to Islamists, seized control of Aden and refused to allow the cabinet to return until Saudi Arabia brokered a power-sharing deal that November. The UN hoped the agreement would clear the way for a political settlement to end the civil war, but in January 2020 there was a sudden escalation in hostilities between the Houthis and coalition-led forces, with fighting on several front lines, missile strikes and air raids. In April 2020 the STC declared self-rule in Aden, breaking a peace deal signed with the internationally recognised government, saying it would govern the port city and southern provinces. Saudi Arabia announced a unilateral ceasefire the same month due to the coronavirus pandemic but the Houthis rejected it, demanding the lifting of air and sea blockades in Sanaa and Hudaydah.

Who are the parties involved?

The Houthi movement, named for a religious leader from the Houthi clan and officially known as Ansar Allah, emerged in the late 1980s as a vehicle for religious and cultural revivalism among Zaydi Shiites in northern Yemen. The Zaydis are a minority in the Sunni Muslim-majority country but predominant in the northern highlands along the Saudi border. The Houthis became politically active after 2003, opposing Saleh for backing the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq but later allying with him after his resignation as president. This alliance was a tactical one: Saleh's loyalists opposed Hadi's UN-backed government and, feeling marginalized in the transition process, sought to regain a leading role in Yemen. Saleh won the allegiance of some members of Yemen's security

forces, tribal networks, and political establishment. But in 2017, after Saleh shifted his support to the Saudi-led coalition, he was killed by Houthi forces. Iran is the Houthis' primary international backer and has reportedly provided them with military support, including weapons. Hadi's government has also accused Hezbollah, Iran's Lebanese ally, of aiding the Houthis. At Hadi's behest in 2015, Saudi Arabia cobbled together a coalition of Sunni-majority Arab states: Bahrain, Egypt, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco, Qatar, Sudan, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). By 2018, the coalition had expanded to include soldiers from Eritrea and Pakistan. They launched an air campaign against the Houthis with the aim of reinstating Hadi's government. For Riyadh, accepting Houthi control of Yemen would mean allowing a hostile neighbor to reside on its southern border, and it would mark a setback in its longstanding contest with Tehran. After Saudi Arabia, the UAE has played the most significant military role in the coalition, contributing some ten thousand ground troops, mostly in Yemen's south. However, the UAE came into conflict with its allies in 2019, when it backed the separatist Southern Transitional Government (STC), which captured Aden. Although the U.S. Congress has been divided on the matter, the United States has backed the Saudi-led coalition, as have France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. U.S. interests include security of Saudi borders.

What has the humanitarian impact been?

The conflict has displaced more than one million people and given rise to cholera outbreaks, medicine shortages, and threats of famine. The United Nations calls the humanitarian crisis in Yemen "the worst in the world." The chaos has also allowed the al-Qaeda affiliate in the region to expand its foothold. With the two

sides locked in a stalemate since late 2015, Yemen descended into a dire humanitarian crisis. In 2016 the UN estimated that more than three-quarters of the population of Yemen lacked access to safe drinking water and sanitation, and nearly half lacked access to sufficient food and medicine. The country also suffered the worst cholera outbreak in history, beginning in late 2016; by May 2019 the number of suspected cholera cases had reached more than 1.7 million, with over 20,000 new cases each week. Children were especially vulnerable, with about 80 percent of Yemenis under the age of 18 facing threats to their health and survival and about one-third of children under 5 years of age facing acute malnutrition. With a poverty rate of more than 50 percent, Yemen was the Arab world's poorest country even prior to the conflict. A recent UN report found that over half of Yemen's thirty million people will experience crisis-level food insecurity by mid-2021. Disease has run rampant; suspected cholera cases reached some seven hundred thousand in 2019. The country has also been hit by the new coronavirus disease, COVID-19, though it is difficult to assess the virus's impact, since there is no comprehensive caseload data. Moreover, as the pandemic has hit the world's economies and disrupted supply chains, many countries have cut back on critical aid to Yemen. The United Nations received less than half the donations requested for Yemen in 2020, raising fears of famine in a country where 80 percent of the population relies on humanitarian assistance. In November 2020, the UN refugee agency reported that, since 2015, the war had displaced more than three million people. (More than one million are internally displaced.) The situation has worsened under the four-year-long land, sea, and air blockade imposed by coalition forces, obstructing vital supplies of food and medicine. The U.S.-based Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) has recorded more than one hundred

thousand deaths due to lack of food, health services, and infrastructure since 2015. In addition, the United Nations has found that both Houthi and coalition forces have violated international humanitarian law by attacking civilian targets. This includes the coalition's destruction of a hospital run by the international relief organization Doctors Without Borders in 2015. Torture, arbitrary arrests, and forced disappearances are among the other violations perpetrated by both sides.

In the Foreseeable Future:

More than two and a half years later, Yemen's war consists of several distinct but overlapping parts – Houthis vs. the Saudi-led coalition, Houthis against Yemeni Sunnis in places such as Ta'izz, a southern independence insurgency against both Houthi-controlled Sana's and the Hadi government, an anti-terrorism campaign, and a Saudi-Iranian proxy war. With victory in any of these wars elusive, the losers are the Yemeni people enduring the world's worst humanitarian crisis. Observers worry that friction among regional actors, including Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, could prolong the war. Conditions deteriorated in late 2019, when the Houthis claimed responsibility for a missile attack on Saudi oil facilities. UN monitors concluded that the Houthis did not carry out the attack but did not say who was behind it; the Saudi-led coalition blamed Iran. Some experts see the Houthis' willingness to claim the attack as a sign of their increasing alignment with the Iranian regime. However, many analysts say viewing Yemen's conflict as an Iran-Saudi Arabia proxy war rather than a civil war overlooks local dynamics that ultimately caused the fighting, and that Yemen's long-term stability hinges on resolving those domestic tensions. Respite will come when global and regional powers implement and enforce an end to hostilities, deliver protected, uninterrupted, and

large-scale humanitarian assistance, and reach a political settlement that puts the needs of the Yemeni people first and foremost.

Currently, the following is the situation:

The medical emergency and the pandemic:

1. COVID continues to be of the utmost importance to the public.
 2. Medical supplies are in short supply, with the covid-19 vaccination being the most notable example.
 3. A scarcity of qualified physicians and medical facilities as a result of infrastructure and hospitals being bombed or otherwise damaged as a result of collateral damage.
 4. There is no evidence of S.O.Ps or public awareness as a result of social instability, restricted news sources, and limited access to media channels.
 5. There have been a number of deaths caused by covid-19 other than collateral harm, 1,428 to be exact.
 6. Women and girls of childbearing age, as well as 1.7 million pregnant and breastfeeding women, have limited or no access to reproductive health services, which include antenatal care, safe delivery, post-partum care, family planning, as well as emergency obstetric and newborn care, according to the World Health Organization. Every two hours, a Yemeni woman dies during delivery, often from complications that might have been avoided if only proper care had been provided.
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Humanitarian:

- More than 4 million internally displaced people live in the Yemeni capital, Sana'a, with the vast majority (about 3.2 million) having lived in their present location for more than a year. A total of 750,000 individuals, the bulk of whom were Yemeni refugees, received financial assistance from the United Nations totaling more than \$34 million.
 - As a consequence of the ports being over-run, major humanitarian aid has been stopped, resulting in the people of Yemen being denied of their most basic household necessities.
 - Yemen's currency, the Riyal, has continued to fall in value, causing inflation
 - to increase and making everyday life more expensive for the country's citizens.
 - IDPs make up roughly four million of Yemen's internally displaced
 - population, with women and children forming the vast bulk of those internally displaced (73 percent). According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Syria, Colombia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are the only three countries that have experienced substantial internal displacement as a result of armed conflict. Following the escalation of violence in 2015, it is estimated that 30% of displaced families are now headed by women, compared to just 9% in the years before to that date. The extremist Houthis arrested and put into camps thousands of African migrants, refugees, and internally displaced persons (IDPs) who were trying to find work in the Gulf states. Yemen is still home to about 32,000 migrants at the present, the most of them are Syrians. It is estimated that more than 11,000 migrants returned home by boat in the past year, according to the
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United Nations' migration agency, the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

- In accordance with a research released in February of this year, Yemen is
- projected to have almost 2.3 million children under the age of five who would suffer from acute malnutrition by 2021, according to the World Health Organization. It is expected that 400,000 of these people would suffer from severe acute malnutrition, and they will most likely die if they do not get immediate medical attention.
- School buildings and hospitals are being used to train Houthi soldiers, including the recruitment of child soldiers and the provision of refuge to the Houthi rebels, resulting in children being deprived of their fundamental human rights and their childhood, in addition to the bombing of hospitals and schools by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
- Additionally, the indirect involvement of the United States of America has
- played a significant role in the recent increase in violence and carnage that has occurred in Yemen, as evidenced by the provision of weapons and ammunition to Saudi Arabia, as well as the provision of general humanitarian assistance.



On the political front:

- As a consequence of human activity, there has been extreme fragmentation of the landscape, resulting in the terrain and surrounding regions being overrun with debris and destroyed infrastructure.
 - An increase in the number of terrorist organisations across the globe contributes significantly to the war, and the creation of organisations such as the Turks and the Houthis contributes to the deterioration of the situation in Yemen and the Middle East.
 - Because of the war between Saudi Arabia and Yemen against the Houthi rebels, there has been a power vacuum that has not been adequately filled since Ali Abdullah Saleh fled the country.
 - War crimes are at an all-time high as a result of a lack of effective law enforcement, resulting in crimes such as looting, robbery, sexual harassment, organ and sex trafficking, among others, being perpetrated.
 - Both sides' violations of the rules of armed conflict are an important contributor to the heinous crimes against humanity being perpetrated in Yemen's war zone.
 - Both sides in the conflict have grown more reliant on extrajudicial killings in recent years, and this trend is expected to continue.
 - The rights of journalists are being severely violated, since the vast majority of journalists are becoming the targets of extrajudicial executions.
 - In the early hours of May 20, 2015, the bodies of two journalists, Abdullah Kabil and Youssef Alaizry, were found after they had been kidnapped and used as human shields by the Houthi militia in regions under attack by the Saudi-led
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coalition's airstrikes in Yemen. Kabil and Alaizry were journalists who worked for the Al Jazeera television network. Among the numerous people who were killed in the assault on the Aden International Airport on December 30, 2020 was Adeeb al-Janani, a reporter in Aden, Yemen, according to reports, and this was just one of the many incidents involving the violation of journalistic rights that have occurred in the country.

- In addition, the consequences and implications of overflow and the domino effect are very severe and even life-threatening.
- The diminishing and fading governmental institutions, along with a lack of law enforcement in respect to managing the crisis presently unfolding in Yemen, have resulted in an absolute state of anarchy and conflict across the country and the world.

Economical considerations:

- Yemen is not self-sufficient in large part because the country is heavily reliant on humanitarian assistance from nations and organisations such as the United Nations.
 - As a result, resources are distributed in an inequitable and enormously unequal manner, resulting in resources being distributed to incorrect parties and stakeholders rather than the needy.
 - The Central Bank has been completely destroyed, which has resulted in a catastrophic economic and financial collapse for the country.
 - It may be argued that the constant inflow of weapons and ammunition to finance the war, mainly from the United States of America in the form of an indirect involvement and ongoing assistance principally directed at the kingdom of Saudi Arabia, is a significant contributing element to the conflict.
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- A significant amount of infrastructure damage is being caused by the war; schools, roads, bridges, hospitals and homes are all regularly bombed as a consequence of the conflict. Human lives are also being lost as a consequence of the war, and the expense of rebuilding and renewing the infrastructure, if it is even feasible in the midst of such intense conflict, would be very expensive for the state, resulting in the government being forced to take out loans.

Aftermath of the war:

Despite the fact that the battle has been going on for 5 to 6 years, the aftermath has stayed almost the same; the only difference has been the scale of the atrocities that are taking place in Yemen, which is now engaged in a civil war.

Fourth, the Yemeni people have suffered the following consequences as a result of the civil war:

- Destroyed infrastructure and widespread insecurity across the nation as a result of the civil war, which has divided the country's citizens on the basis of their political views and positions. Hundreds of allegedly unlawful Saudi-led coalition airstrikes have been documented by Human Rights Watch, including deadly attacks on Yemeni fishing boats that have claimed the lives of dozens of people. According to the organisation, the airstrikes appeared to be deliberate attacks on civilians and civilian objects in violation of the laws of war. Based on data compiled by Yemen Data Project, the Saudi-led coalition has launched more than 20,100 airstrikes on Yemen since the war began, an average of 12 attacks per day, as of the time of this writing. In addition to hospitals and school buses, the coalition has targeted markets and mosques as well as
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farms, bridges, manufacturing plants, and correctional institutions. correctional institutions.

- Because of the condition of chaos in Yemen, crimes such as human trafficking have become commonplace. Given the extensive instability in Yemen, it is impossible to determine the number of individuals who are trafficked, but nongovernmental organisations (NGOs) have said that many Yemeni communities are at risk as a consequence of the armed conflict and economic conditions.

Yemen's economy, which was already struggling before to the conflict, has been badly harmed as a result. Numerous public sector workers have not received a monthly salary in several years. Hundreds of thousands of families no longer have a reliable source of income. The devastation caused by the country's collapsing economy has worsened the humanitarian crisis.

In Yemen, the use of juvenile soldiers has risen to unprecedented levels of prominence. A report released in 2019 by the United Nations Group of Eminent International and Regional Experts on Yemen found that since September 2014, all parties in the conflict have used child soldiers under the age of 18, with some troops as young as 15 years old. A total of 3,034 children have been recruited throughout the war in Yemen, with the Houthis recruiting 1,940 of them, representing for 64 percent of all the youngsters recruited, according to the UN Secretary General. Despite worldwide criticism, a large number of Yemenis end up engaging in the ongoing conflict, with Saudi Arabia playing a major role in the recruiting process. In exchange for each individual they deliver to the Saudi Arabian border, recruiters are compensated. However, many of the individuals recruited are young soldiers who live in difficult circumstances, making them easy prey for those looking to

take advantage of their predicament. Recruiters receive a monetary reward for each individual they deliver to the Saudi Arabian border.

Extrajudicial executions are being carried out in large numbers, particularly by the Houthis, in order to maintain control over the general public. Individuals perceived to be political opponents or security threats have been arbitrarily detained by Houthi forces, the Yemeni government, and the United Arab Emirates and UAE-backed Yemeni forces, among other groups. Apart from being mistreated and kept in terrible circumstances, prisoners have also been unjustly imprisoned, including some who were forcefully disappeared. Unprecedented numbers of arbitrary detentions and enforced disappearances in Yemen have been documented by human rights organisations and lawyers in the country.

Members of the international community (b.) include:

For example, the spillover effect, which results in an influx of migrants into neighbouring countries such as Oman and Saudi Arabia as a result of the fact that Omanis are not complacent about their own safety and security. Almost 40 years have passed since the Sultanate's suppression of the Dhofar Rebellion in 1976, and Oman has remained relatively peaceful. Although Oman is situated in a dangerous neighbourhood, the Arab Gulf country is not immune to transregional threats as a result of its geographic position in the Middle East. The possibility of contagion from the Yemeni war exists.

2. The Baab al Mandeb, a strait through which the vast majority of the world's oil exports pass, as well as the Strait of Hormuz, which is a critical route for the Suez Canal, are both under risk of being blocked.

3. An attack on Hodeidah's dockside equipment at the outset of Yemen's 20-month-old war destroyed the equipment, making it impossible to unload the food and fuel needed for a population devastated by hunger and disease on a rising scale. It is believed that Hodeidah, which is controlled by the Iran-aligned Houthi militia, receives 70 percent of Yemen's food imports and humanitarian aid. The food supply has been said to have been cut in half, according to them. It used to be a thriving port until the war began, which has claimed the lives of 10,000 people and caused three million people to escape from their homes. Yemen's people are suffering from malnutrition as a result of the damaged and over-run dock, which is also impacting nations who were active importers and exporters with Yemen in the past.
4. In addition, according to the United Nations, the growth of transnational terrorist organisations presents a danger to the integrity and security of the Middle Eastern area.

Stakeholders

Iran: Historically, Iran has long maintained a diplomatic presence in Sanaa, but its influence during the two decades before the war was marginal especially in contrast with the major countries, notably Saudi Arabia and Oman, Yemen's immediate neighbors. During the six Saadah wars between 2004 and 2010, former President Ali Abdullah Saleh asserted that Iran was supporting the Houthis, but U.S. analysts found little evidence to support his claims. In 2011 and 2012, Iran's role began to change during the Arab Spring uprising and the subsequent political turmoil. Tehran's support for the Houthis increased in that period, although Iran was not a player in negotiations that led to Saleh's resignation. The Iranians probably played a role in forging the Houthi-Saleh

partnership that led to the current civil war.

Evidence of Iranian intervention to support the Houthis, including with military assistance, began to grow in 2012. In January 2013, the U.S. Navy, in cooperation with the Yemeni Navy, seized an Iranian dhow, the Jihan I, carrying some forty tons of military supplies intended for the Houthis. The cargo included Katyusha rockets, surface-to-air missiles, rocket-propelled grenades, explosives and ammunition. The United States also tracked Iranian Revolutionary Guards providing training and assistance to the Houthis in the Saadah governorate. Iran's support of the Houthis grew increasingly open and transparent after the successful military drive by Houthis and Saleh loyalists in the summer of 2014. The Houthis seized control of Sanaa, the capital, and Yemeni government operations. Houthi leaders traveled to Tehran and signed agreements to establish regular air service between the two capitals; they also agreed to increase Yemeni-Iranian cooperation. Iranian supplies and personnel, including Lebanese Hezbollah allies, began flowing into Yemen. The Iranians also increasingly promoted their own brand of Twelver Shiism over the traditional Zaydi sect practiced in Yemen. Their efforts deepened sectarian divisions, another dimension to the conflict. Since 2014, Houthi rhetoric (echoing Iranian propaganda) and provocations threatening Saudi Arabia's security have become more frequent. Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif in 2017 insisted at the time that Iran would support an end to the conflict in Yemen. In public, Zarif has repeatedly argued that Iran's "four-point plan" is the only viable option for ending the Yemen conflict. There is little evidence to support Zarif's insistence that Tehran would support a political agreement to end the conflict — or that his position reflects the larger views of the Iranian government. Hard-line elements appear to see the continuation of the conflict as a

relatively low-cost and low-risk means of sustaining political, economic, and military pressure on the Saudis. Saudi Arabia's intervention has reportedly cost between \$5 billion and \$6 billion a month, while Iran's expenditures in Yemen probably total only millions a year. Subsequently Saudi Arabia's perception that the Houthis are an Iranian proxy rather than an indigenous movement has driven Riyadh's military intervention. But many regional specialists say that Tehran's influence is likely limited, especially since Iranians and Houthis adhere to different schools of Shiite Islam. Still, Iran and the Houthis share geopolitical interests: Tehran seeks to challenge Saudi and U.S. dominance in the region, and the Houthis oppose Hadi's U.S.- and Saudi- backed government. Making the Saudi involvement a prime reason for a strengthened IranHouthi association.

Tehran has not provided meaningful assistance to address Yemen's catastrophic humanitarian crisis nor has it pledged future assistance to help Yemen rebuild after fighting ends. Yemen's future remains inextricably linked to the future of its neighbors in the Arabian Peninsula more than to the Islamic Republic.

Evidence also suggests that Iran's support to the Houthis in Yemen is very small compared to that of Iraq, Syria, or Lebanon. The weapons and business Houthis get via the black market from the Yemeni government, for example, are worth more than the funding they get from Iran. Arguably countries like Oman and Russia currently have more direct leverage over the Houthis than Iran does.

Somalia:

Somalia, an east African country, shares maritime borders with Yemen. Somalia itself has been subjected to internal crises and conflict making it not only unsafe for its own people but also

susceptible to political monopolies in the region. As the country itself faces a humanitarian crisis with a major shortage of food supplies, many Somalians sought refuge in Yemen.

Refugee movements from Somalia to Yemen have been taking place since the 1980s. They continued following the outbreak of civil war in Somalia, with many fleeing generalized violence and individualized fear of persecution in addition to the consequences of drought and a lack of livelihood opportunities.

With Yemen being the world's largest humanitarian crisis and civilians facing lifethreatening conditions, the situation for refugees and asylum seekers and migrants has deteriorated significantly. From over 150,000 Somali refugees in Yemen, 4,300 refugees have returned home from Yemen, since the roll-out in 2017 of an Assisted Spontaneous Return (ASR) programme, facilitated by UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency in cooperation with humanitarian partners and authorities in Yemen and Somalia.

As the matters in Yemen escalated the government showed concern as the chances of sectarian violence breaking out were immense. Somalis are Sunnis while Houthis are Shias so supporting the current Saudi-led invasion which would inevitably endanger Somali refugees in Yemen as they could be seen as enemies instead of refugees.

Abdisalam Hadliye, Somalia's foreign minister is of the view that Somalia shares the same crisis existing in Yemen, the Somalian government extends support and sympathy for the government in Yemen. The government has offered to use its airspace, territorial waters and land for Saudi-led air strikes against the Houthi rebels in Yemen.

As a nation geographically close to Yemen, and the worsening socioeconomic situation of Yemen, According to the U.N. refugee agency (UNHCR), at least 14,000 Yemeni refugees have sought shelter in Somalia since March 2015.

UAE:

a) On February 9, 2020, the UAE's government celebrated the conclusion of its phased military withdrawal from Yemen at a ceremony in Zayed Military City, after five years of engagement in the country's civil war as part of the Saudi-led coalition. The chances for a military end to the conflict diminished significantly after the December 2018 Stockholm Agreement constrained forces battling for control of the port city of Hodeida and raised tensions in the Gulf, calling into question the UAE's continued involvement. The UAE's disengagement has provided a way out of the Yemeni deadlock, but it does not halt Abu Dhabi's participation in the alliance or limit Emirati influence on the ground. As the UAE's deputy chief of staff, Lt. Gen. Eisa Saif al-Mazrouei, has stated, the underpinning of the UAE's "Peace First" strategy is a shift from direct to indirect engagement in the country through increased dependence on local proxies and allies.

b) Implications

i) The withdrawal of the UAE has enormous ramifications for both the conflict and the peace process. First, the UAE's military withdrawal, together with Sudan's considerable reduction in forces from over 15,000 to just over 650, will further isolate Saudi Arabia in Yemen, raising external pressure on the country. It will also undermine the Saudi-led coalition not only in terms of resources, arms, and welltrained troops, but also in terms of operational capacity to wage effective military campaigns, as emphasised by Michael Knights of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. This leaves Saudi Arabia with fewer options in Yemen:

continue fighting to shift the balance of power in what has become a protracted war despite clear intra-coalition divisions; strengthen its counterpart, the Yemeni government, before negotiating peace with the Houthis; or press the government to reach a fragile agreement with the rebels to secure a face-saving retreat. Regardless of Riyadh's decision, Abu Dhabi has begun the countdown to the coalition's final military withdrawal.

ii) Second, the Yemeni government has become more weak as a result of the UAE's exit, but principally as a result of the legacy Abu Dhabi has left behind: local organisations with heavy weaponry and mixed objectives with disputed territorial control. This restricts the Yemeni government's mandate and bargaining power in upcoming peace talks. The legitimacy of President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi's rule continues to crumble as the STC-affiliated SBF assumes security control of the temporary capital, Aden, especially since the Saudi-brokered Riyadh Agreement has yet to materialise three months later. The deal's implementation will continue to be a major hurdle for Riyadh's peace efforts.

iii) Finally, the Saudi-led coalition now has rival wings battling multiple opponents, including each other, with the Houthis benefiting in the end. Given Islah's dominance, STC-affiliated militants will likely continue to target the Islamist party and the Yemeni government, either under the banner of "counterterrorism" or under the guise of combating "Islah influence," in order to assuage the UAE's concerns and expand territorial control in the southern and eastern governorates. The west coast forces, particularly those led by Brig. Gen. Tareq Saleh, may continue to battle the Houthis on multiple fronts, including alongside Yemeni government soldiers and with limited aircraft support, but they are unlikely to make significant territorial gains under the current circumstances.

iv) Fourth, given that it has not officially stopped its membership in the coalition for symbolic and security reasons, Abu Dhabi is extremely likely to maintain counterterrorism engagement in coordination with the US and local proxies on the ground. Given its counterterrorism relationship with the UAE in Yemen, the US may face three important obstacles, including first, regulating the politicisation of counterterrorism operations to combat Islah and its affiliates, and second, creating clear distinctions between attacking Islah and AQAP/ISIS.

v) Fifth, due to its intimate links with the armed factions it supports across the freed territory, the UAE will continue to play an essential role in conflict settlement efforts. While the UAE's pullout will appease international critics and help to rehabilitate the country's damaged reputation, Abu Dhabi will continue to wield enormous power over the STC, a political umbrella organisation that brings together numerous armed factions in the south. The UAE can apply legitimate pressure on the STC to participate in the next round of UN-led peace talks as part of the Yemeni government delegation or as an independent entity, depending on its interests. If the STC's goal is to control political Islam rather than reshape Yemen's political geography, it will most likely want to join the government's delegation. If backing Saudi activities in Yemen is a strategic priority, the UAE can likewise urge the STC to follow the Riyadh Agreement.

vi) As a result, it is apparent that the UAE's exit will have no impact on Yemen's influence in the near future. Abu Dhabi will continue to play a crucial role in the conflict and peace process, especially given its patron-client relationship with the entities it funds – a dynamic that is unlikely to change in the near future. While it is unclear what will happen next in Yemen, the UAE is certain to play a key role in whatever happens next.

KSA:a) *Takeaways*

Two particular actions taken by Saudi Arabia have caused Congress to revisit the US-Saudi relationship:

- (1) Saudi-led military operations in Yemen that have killed thousands of innocent civilians and left millions on the brink of starvation; and
- (2) The 2018 brutal murder of Washington Post journalist Jamal Khashoggi—a Saudi citizen and US resident—carried out by the Saudi government in Istanbul, Turkey.
- (3) KSA also has an important role in Yemen due to the strait of Hormuz which is a key waterway leading into the Suez canal

b) Saudi Arabia and the United States share a number of mutual security and economic interests. However, Saudi actions in Yemen and its murder of a US-resident journalist demonstrate the country is capable of dangerous and destabilizing behavior. Instead of criticizing the Saudi Crown Prince for ordering this murder, as concluded by the US intelligence community, President Trump has doubled down on his support to the Crown Prince.

This action sends a signal to autocrats and dictators everywhere that the United States will continue to support them no matter what actions they take. Rather than allow this to be the status quo, Congress must work to hold Saudi Arabia accountable for its actions and further examine ways to rebalance the US-Saudi relationship in light of the Kingdom's actions.

c) To do so, bipartisan majorities in the House and Senate have passed a number of pieces of legislation aimed at blocking US arms sales to Saudi Arabia and ending US support to Saudi Arabia's operations in Yemen.⁴⁶ Unfortunately, President Trump vetoed

several of these legislative actions, and a vote to override the president's veto on a resolution to end US support to Saudi Arabia's operations in Yemen failed to gain enough votes in the Senate.

d) President Trump has made support to Saudi Arabia a central tenet of his strategy in the Middle East. He has not wavered in the face of the Kingdom's increasingly destabilizing and repugnant actions. Although Saudi Arabia has been escalating the conflict in Yemen over the past several years, the country's 2018 killing of a US permanent resident journalist tipped the scales on a growing unease about US support for Saudi military operations in Yemen and the United States' overall relationship with the country.

e) Since 9/11, Saudi Arabia has been viewed as a key US partner on a number of mutual security and economic interests. However, the two countries have strongly disagreed on a number of key issues of concern. As a result of the Kingdom's actions, many on Capitol Hill are attempting to limit or end US support to Saudi Arabia.

USA:

- a) They are the largest arms seller to the KSA intervening in Yemen
- i. Around 5 billion Dollars from 2010-2015
 - ii. Authorization of more than 20 billion worth of arm sales
 - iii. 20 Abraham Tanks in the recent deal in 2016, where these were listed as damage replacements, for the battles fought in Yemen
 - iv. These sales also included cluster bombs that were banned by the international community and the sale so F-15's
 - v. The USA is also using its aircraft carriers in the Arabian Sea and in the Incirlik Airbase in Turkey to refuel Saudi air forces. through their KC-135 tankers, averaging at 2 refueling missions a day in the conflict's peak
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- vi. In state department documents dating January 20, 2016 acquired by reporters there are listings of limiting U.S exposure to LOAC concerns
- vii. This is also includes a International Court decision dating back to 2013 listing that if the US continues to “provide practical assistance, encouragement or moral support” to the Saudi’s they can be charged and trialed for potential war crimes
- viii. Following this on October 16 2015, the US issued a no-strike list to the Saudis to mitigate civilian casualties

b) They send Humanitarian aid to Yemen, however that aid is either blocked at the port of Hudeida or is given to corruption.

c) The USA is also supporting this campaign since they also want to eliminate the presence of Al-Qaeda in Yemen and prevent it from becoming a breeding ground for terrorism.

Syria:

a) *History*

i) In February 2011, Syrians began protesting rural poverty, corruption, the incarceration of political prisoners, and the absence of freedom of expression and democratic rights, amid turmoil that erupted across numerous Middle Eastern and North African nations.⁶ In March, Syrian security forces in Dar'a imprisoned and mistreated a number of Syrian children suspected of spraying antigovernment graffiti, sparking more peaceful protests in the city.⁷ Protests erupted across the Syrian Arab Republic after the deaths of Thamer Al Sharee, 14, and Hamza Ali Al Khateeb, 13, seized in a separate incident, were discovered disfigured.

ii) In April 2013, Jabhat al-Nusra¹³, a spinoff of Al-Qaida in Iraq that had developed in 2012, split out and began operating independently while cooperating with other armed groups. In the meantime, ISIL secured power in eastern Syria, in particular, and rapidly expanded, declaring itself a "caliphate" in June 2014.

iii) The United States of America declared the establishment of a multinational coalition to combat ISIL in September 2014.¹⁴ Initially tasked with combatting ISIL in Iraq at the request of the Iraqi government, the coalition has also conducted operations against ISIL in the Syrian Arab Republic, which are still ongoing. Both the Russian Federation and Turkey would justify their actions by citing the fight against terrorism.

iv) In August 2013, a large sarin-filled rocket attack on eastern Ghutah murdered, maimed, injured, and scared Syrian residents. Shortly after the assault, the Syrian Arab Republic signed the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, preventing a possible US military intervention.

v) In response to the deteriorating humanitarian situation, the Security Council enacted Resolution 2165 (2014) authorising the use of four international border crossings for humanitarian aid, particularly for besieged and hard-to-reach people. Resolution 2533 limited the number of crossings to just one by July 2020.

vi) In 2015, the "Syrian Democratic Fighters" were founded as an alliance consisting mostly of Kurdish People's Protection Units forces and their supporters among Arab and Assyrian armed groups, as well as other opposition groups. By late 2015, they had

taken control of a growing area in the north-east and near the Turkish border, including Ayn al-Arab (Aleppo) and Tall Abyad (Raqqa).

vii) The liberation of eastern Aleppo city by the government in late 2016 marked another key turning point in the battle.¹⁹ After government shelling and airstrikes destroyed parts of eastern Aleppo city, government forces and armed factions negotiated a "evacuation agreement" in mid-December.

vii) Although chemical weapons would be used on a regular basis during that time, the sarin attack on Khan Sheykhun (Idlib) in April 2017, which killed 83 people, including 28 children and 23 women, and injured another 293 people, including 103 children, prompted the United States, France, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain to launch the first direct airstrikes on Syrian government facilities.

b) *Forces of the government vs. non-government forces*

i) The government has long justified military action by citing the fight against terrorism, without discriminating between UN-designated terrorist groups and other armed groups. While States have an obligation to protect their populations against terrorism, the Commission has frequently reminded them that they must do so in full compliance with international human rights law and, where appropriate, international humanitarian law.

ii) In addition to the widespread commission of war crimes, there are reasonable reasons to suspect that government and pro-government forces have perpetrated crimes against humanity in the use of airstrikes and artillery shelling of civilian areas on many occasions.³² Witnesses disputed the presence of any military

target in the majority of the cases reported by the Commission, and the Russian Federation and the Syrian Arab Republic governments both declined to respond to the individual incidents.

iii) During the day, both the Syrian military and the Russian air force used explosive bombs with wide-area impacts to assault residential neighbourhoods, including crowded markets, killing and wounding civilians in attacks that amounted to war crimes.

iv) The Commission takes note of the heinous, well-documented practise of progovernment forces targeting hospitals and clinics, which began in 2012³⁸ and accelerated in 2016.³⁹ Countless civilians were denied access to health care as a result of these strikes, which amounted to war crimes by deliberately targeting protected objects, medical workers, and transportation.

v) The US-led coalition also carried out airstrikes that were documented to have resulted in civilian casualties, despite taking all reasonable precautions to avoid and minimise incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, and damage to civilian property, in violation of international humanitarian law. The aerial campaign to retake Raqqah city reportedly damaged or destroyed up to 80% of the city's buildings, killing and injuring thousands of civilians and rendering parts of the city uninhabitable, displacing nearly the entire population and raising concerns that the widespread destruction included indiscriminate attacks.

c) *Sieges*

Sieges were frequently ended by the adoption of "evacuation agreements," which were arranged by warring parties and concerned the departure of fighters, their families, and civilians of

opposing viewpoints from besieged locations. Health-care workers and activists were frequently denied the opportunity to reconcile. 72 The utilisation of such agreements, according to the Commission, amounted to the war crime of forcible displacement of civilians for each civilian who was unable to freely decide on his or her movement or destination.

c) Conflict's gender-based effects

i) Civilians' experiences in the Syrian Arab Republic's conflict have been profoundly gendered. Since 2011, the Commission has documented sexual and gender-based violence against women, girls, men, and boys. 74 Women and girls were disproportionately affected by the great suffering caused by those abuses, despite the fact that Syrians of all origins were harmed.

ii) In terms of freedom of movement, Syrians had disparate and gendered effects. Women and girls residing in ISIL-controlled areas were subjected to the most severe restrictions, with many being barred from walking outside in the absence of a male relative and from participating in public life. Hay'at Tahrir AlSham and other armed organisations imposed similar limitations as well. Men and boys, meanwhile, were frequently unable to walk freely in areas held by government forces or the Syrian Democratic Forces, for fear of being conscripted or arrested.

iii) Hay'at Tahrir Al-Sham 76 caused serious psychological and bodily harm to women, girls, men, and boys throughout the territories under its control by imposing religious clothing standards and, in the case of women and girls, prohibiting them freedom of movement without a male relative. Women and girls were disproportionately affected by edicts legally conveyed to

communities under Hay'at Tahrir Al-Sham rule, and discriminatory treatment on the basis of sex was evident, in violation of international human rights principles.

Afghanistan:

The Afghan war consists of an internal conflict that began in 1978 between anticommunist Islamic guerrillas and the Afghan communist government (aided in 1979–89 by Soviet troops), leading to the overthrow of the government in 1992, the military activity within Afghanistan after 1992 and the U.S.-led invasion launched in response to the September 11 attacks on the United States in 2001.

Before civil war erupted in 1978, Afghanistan was a monarchy under Muhammad Zahir Shah, who had come to power in 1933. After World War II, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union used economic assistance to compete for influence. After the US established military ties with Pakistan in 1954, Afghanistan increasingly turned to Soviet Union support.

Zahir Shah followed by his cousin Daoud Khan ran a centrist government which actively tried to disengage with communist elements however with peoples increasing support the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), a Marxist-Leninist party was formed. In 1977 PDPA launched a coup on April 27, 1978, killing Daoud and seizing power. The PDPA government then embarked on a campaign of radical land reform accompanied by mass repression in the countryside that resulted in the arrest and summary execution of tens of thousands. Those targeted included political figures, religious leaders, teachers, students, other professionals, Islamist organizations, and members of ethnic minorities, particularly the Hazaras, a Shi'a minority that has long been subject to discrimination by Afghanistan's ruling elite. The

government's repressive measures, particularly its attempt to reform rural society through terror, provoked uprisings throughout the country. Alarmed by the deteriorating situation, especially the collapse of the army and the prospect that a disintegrating Afghanistan would threaten its security on its southern border, the Soviet Union airlifted thousands of troops into Kabul on December 24, 1979.

Islamist organizations that became the heart of the resistance – and collectively became known as the jihad fighters or mujahidin – based themselves in Pakistan and Iran.. Seeing the conflict as a cold war battleground, the United States and Saudi Arabia, in particular, provided massive support for the resistance, nearly all of it funneled through Pakistan. Negotiations to end the war culminated in the 1988 Geneva Accords, whose centerpiece was an agreement by the Soviet Union to remove all its uniformed troops by February 1989. With substantial Soviet assistance, the communist government held on to power through early 1992 while the United Nations frantically tried to assemble a transitional process acceptable to all the parties. It failed. In the aftermath, the U.S. and its allies abandoned any further efforts toward a peace process until after the Taliban came to power. The UN effort continued.

Soon after Afghanistan saw a power struggle among various factions and political parties from the Mujahideen to the members of the Jamat i Islami (leading the ISA; Islamic State of Afghanistan) and several other individuals that engaged in a full-scale civil war in Kabul. In 1994 alone, an estimated 25,000 were killed in Kabul, most of them civilians killed in rocket and artillery attacks. By 1995, onethird of the city had been reduced to rubble. Humanitarian agencies frequently found their offices stripped, their vehicles hijacked, and their staff threatened.

From the mid 1990s to 2001 what continued was Taliban rule after the United States invaded Afghanistan. The Taliban leadership quickly lost control of the country as the US retaliated to the 9/11 attacks by invading Afghanistan. The Taliban relocated to the south waged an insurgency against the Western-backed government in Kabul, Afghan national security forces, and international coalition troops. Violence across Afghanistan continued in 2020 and 2021 as the United States increased air strikes and raids targeting the Taliban. Meanwhile, the Taliban attacked Afghan government and Afghan security forces targets and made territorial gains. Civilian casualties across Afghanistan have remained high over the past several years. The United Nations documented a then-record high of 10,993 civilian casualties in 2018. Although 2019 saw a slight decline, civilian casualties exceeded 10,000 for the sixth year in a row and brought the total UN-documented civilian casualties since 2009 to more than 100,000. Despite another decline in 2020, the first half of 2021 saw a record high number of civilian casualties as the Taliban ramped up their military offensive amid the withdrawal of international troops.

Humanitarian crisis:

UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, is warning of a looming humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan as the escalating conflict brings increased human suffering and civilian displacement. An estimated 270,000 Afghans have been newly displaced inside the country since January 2021 – primarily due to insecurity and violence – bringing the total uprooted population to over 3.5 million. Families forced to flee their homes in recent weeks cite the worsening security situation as the predominant reason for their flight. In addition to ongoing fighting, displaced civilians have told UNHCR and partners of incidents of extortion by non-state armed groups

and the presence of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) on major roads. Many have reported interruptions to social services and a loss of income due to rising insecurity.

The number of civilian casualties has risen 29 per cent during the first quarter of this year compared to 2020, according to the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan. An increasing proportion of women and children were among those targeted.

The needs of those who have had to flee suddenly are acute.

UNHCR and partners, as part of a coordinated response, are assisting newly displaced Afghans with emergency shelter, food, health, water and sanitation support and cash assistance, despite challenges in accessing vulnerable groups. Civilian casualties in Afghanistan reached record levels in the first half of 2021. Women and children are increasingly bearing the brunt of the conflict.

Many are frequently subjected to violence, abuse and forced labor. And most lack access to health care, education and legal services.

The resilience of the Afghan people has been pushed to the limit by prolonged conflict, high levels of displacement, the impact of COVID-19, recurrent natural disasters, including drought, and deepening poverty. Some 65 percent of the Afghan population – in and outside of Afghanistan – are children and young people.

Iran and Pakistan host nearly 90 percent of displaced Afghans - more than two million registered Afghan refugees in total. Both countries have granted access to territory and protection to Afghan refugees, along with health and educational services through national systems. Their hospitality and inclusive policies, spanning decades and generations, cannot be taken for granted.

Despite many years of aid, Afghanistan's government has struggled to provide clean water, electricity, safe roads and education services for its people. As a result, 18.4 million Afghans need humanitarian support. Hundreds of thousands of people in

Afghanistan have been internally displaced by conflict this year—but accurate and up-to-date figures are unavailable, because where fighting is most intense, humanitarian aid workers have also been forced to temporarily flee.

The likelihood of extreme weather events in Afghanistan, which is already prone to natural disasters, is rising due to climate change. These disasters coupled with the COVID-19 pandemic and ongoing conflict mean that more Afghans at home and abroad are being pushed into poverty, and increasing numbers of people are facing food insecurity. The number of people in need for 2021 nearly doubled compared to early 2020.

Myanmar:

The Rohingyas described as one of the most discriminated people in the world by the UN Secretary General, constituent to be one of Myanmar's many ethnic groups. In 2011, when Myanmar began the process of political, social and economic reform. This led to more freedoms for civilians and increased foreign investment. Despite these changes ethni groups are vulnerable and susceptible to exploitation there. The Rohingya community have their own language and culture and say they are descendants of Arab traders and other groups who have been in the region for generations. But the government of Myanmar, a predominantly Buddhist country, denies the Rohingya citizenship and even excluded them from the 2014 census, refusing to recognise them as a people. It sees them as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. Since the 1970s, Rohingya have migrated across the region in significant numbers. Estimates of their numbers are often much higher than official figures. In the last few years, before the latest crisis, thousands of Rohingya made perilous journeys out of Myanmar to escape communal violence or alleged abuses by the security forces.

The mass immigration of Rohingya Muslims began on 25 August 2017 after Rohingya Arsa militants launched deadly attacks on more than 30 police posts.

Accounts of Rohingyas suggest that they fled after troops, backed by local Buddhist mobs, responded by burning their villages and attacking and killing civilians. At least 6,700 Rohingyas, including at least 730 children under the age of five, were killed in the month after the violence broke out, according to medical charity Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF). Amnesty International says the Myanmar military also raped and abused Rohingya women and girls. The Rohingyas, who numbered around one million in Myanmar at the start of 2017, are one of the many ethnic minorities in the country. Rohingyas Muslims represent the largest percentage of Muslims in Myanmar, with the majority living in Rakhine state. At least 288 villages were partially or totally destroyed by fire in northern Rakhine state after August 2017, according to analysis of satellite imagery by Human Rights Watch.

Current Crises:

In January 2020, the UN's top court ordered the Buddhist-majority country to take measures to protect members of its Rohingya community from genocide. But the army in Myanmar (formerly Burma) has said it was fighting Rohingya militants and denies targeting civilians. The country's leader Aung San Suu Kyi, once a human rights icon, repeatedly denied allegations of genocide. On February 1st 2021, the military in Myanmar detained senior members of the civilian government after claiming the country's November 2020 elections were fraudulent. Mass protests have continued unabated since, despite hundreds of demonstrators killed and many more arrested. Protestors dependent on messaging apps and social media have found communications disrupted.

Humanitarian Concerns:

Clashes in the northeast of the country have increased levels of displacement inside the population. Further economic breakdown promises to disrupt communities nationwide as businesses and banks find it difficult to function, foreign investment dries up, workers strike and migrants flee the country. The situation that led to killings, rapes and gang rapes, torture, forced displacement and other grave rights violations in 2017 is expected remained unchanged. The lack of accountability in the country further made it difficult to fully assess the said allegations or criminalise genocide.

Refugee crisis:

The massive numbers of refugees who fled to Bangladesh in 2017 joined hundreds of thousands of Rohingya who had fled Myanmar in previous years. Kutupalong, the largest refugee settlement in the world according to UNHCR, is home to more than 600,000 refugees alone.

International response:

A report published by UN investigators in August 2018 accused Myanmar's military of carrying out mass killings and rapes with "genocidal intent". The ICJ case, lodged by the small Muslim-majority nation of The Gambia, in West Africa, on behalf of dozens of other Muslim countries, called for emergency measures to be taken against the Myanmar military, known as Tatmadaw, until a fuller investigation could be launched. Aung San Suu Kyi rejected allegations of genocide when she appeared at the court in December 2019.

Questions a resolution must answer

- 1) How can the Social, Humanitarian and Cultural implications of the Yemen crises be minimized
 - 2) What reforms are needed at a national level for Yemen to achieve stability
 - 3) What role do the major stakeholders have in accordance to the crises and how should they exercise their power to reduce the scale of impact
 - 4) How should the countries, responsible for the crises itself be, held accountable
 - 5) How can the UN and the International community itself prove to be an ally to the people of Yemen
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